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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Xu Feng appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
University of Delaware on his claim that the University discriminated against him on the 
basis of his national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.1  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
A. Discussion2 
Feng, a Chinese national, enrolled in a graduate program at the University and 
elected to take classes in person, which required an F-1 visa.  To obtain that visa, he had to 
“pursue a full course of study,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), which the University has 
defined for over 30 years to mean full-time enrollment, or nine credit hours for graduate 
students.  Feng “enroll[ed] in three courses instead of one” to satisfy this requirement, but 
his academic “performance plummeted, and he was eventually expelled from the program” 
for failing to maintain the minimum 2.0 GPA required by the University to remain in good 
academic standing.  Feng v. Univ. of Del., 785 F. App’x, 53, 55 (3d Cir. 2019).  Feng makes 
several arguments why the nine-credit requirement is discriminatory, but we agree with the 
District Court that each is unavailing.   
 
1 We previously affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the University on Feng’s state law claims.  See Feng v. Univ. of Del., 785 F. App’x 53, 
57 (3d Cir. 2019).   
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the summary judgment order de novo, affirming only 
“if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.”  Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal 




The District Court rejected that the credit policy is facially discriminatory, focusing 
not on the full course of study” requirement in immigration law, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), but rather the University’s own definition of full-time as nine credit 
hours.  This definition applied to all full-time graduate students, including those seeking 
F-1 visas, and by its terms did not single out students of foreign origin for different 
treatment.  Thus, Feng’s facial-discrimination argument is “a nonstarter because nothing 
in the [policy] mentions [the protected trait].”  Bryan v. Gov’t of V.I., 916 F.3d 242, 246–
47 (3d Cir. 2019). 
For the same reasons, the District Court concluded Feng had presented “no direct 
evidence of an intent to discriminate.”  A4.  Federal law imposed the “full course of study,” 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), requirement on Feng as a condition of his visa, and the 
University defined full-time the same way for all of its graduate students attending classes 
in person.  Far from a “trail of direct evidence,” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 
247, 275 (3d Cir. 2014), then, the record reflects the University merely abiding by federal 
law and its own policies.   
In the absence of direct evidence, the District Court analyzed whether Feng could 
establish a discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence under the familiar 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework:  If the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie 
case of national-origin discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate “some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action; if defendant provides that 
reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show it is pretextual.  Castleberry v. STI 




We have acknowledged that “[a]lthough the prima facie elements of a 
discrimination claim vary depending on the particular facts of the case, the plaintiff must 
generally present evidence that raises an inference of discrimination.”  Storey v. Burns Int’l 
Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Feng points to deposition testimony confirming that, as the only international 
student in his program, he alone was subject to the nine-credit requirement and that the 30 
credits all students needed to complete the program was separate from the “full course of 
study,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i), needed for an F-1 visa.  But that testimony only 
confirms that immigration law was the source of any additional credits requirement or 
different treatment and that, as the District Court concluded, Feng cannot make out a prima 
facie case of national-origin discrimination.   
In sum, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Feng, there are no 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to his discrimination claims, and the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the University.   
B. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
